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POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT:
A GOVERNMENT OF MEN?
ILLYA LICHTENBERG1
“If Jefferson were writing the Declaration of Independence today he
would undoubtedly be besieged to include an assertion of the inalienable
right to the pursuit of happiness’ in an automobile.”2

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 426
II. POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC
ENFORCEMENT: THE LAW.................................................... 427
III. POLICE DISCRETION IN TRAFFIC
ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ............................... 430
A. Whren and Atwater ...................................................... 434
IV. POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC
ENFORCEMENT: PRACTICE ................................................... 436
A. The Scope of Police Discretion in Traffic Stops.......... 436
B. Conduct of the Motorist During the Traffic Stop......... 439
C. Demeanor .................................................................... 439
D. Factors Unrelated to the Motorist’s
Conduct Influencing Police Discretion ....................... 442
E. Quotas, Shifts, and Dates............................................. 442
F. Easy Targets and “Duck Ponds” ................................ 445
V. IMMUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS AND
PLACE OF RESIDENCE .......................................................... 446
A. Age ............................................................................... 446
B. Race ............................................................................. 447
C. Sex................................................................................ 447
D. Place of Residence....................................................... 448
E. The Privileged, Non-enforcement and
Ticket Fixing ................................................................ 448
VI. DISCUSSION ......................................................................... 450
VII. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 452
1

The author is currently an assistant professor at Montclair State University in the
sociology department. His research addresses numerous areas intersecting law and social
science with particular emphasis on traffic enforcement and the Fourth Amendment. The
author would like to thank Alisa Smith and G.O.W. Mueller for their comments on earlier
drafts of this article.
2

Arthur Vanderbilt Traffic Law Enforcement from the Standpoint of the Courts, 4
RUTGERS L. REV. 555, 561 (1950).

425

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003

1

426

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:425

I. INTRODUCTION
Police across the nation have long been accused of using the broad discretion3
afforded to them in traffic enforcement as a pretext for criminal investigation.4
Despite this widely held belief, there is little evidence to suggest that courts have put
forth any effort, or have even considered remedying5 or reducing the wide spread
abuse of police discretion6 in traffic stops,7 with the exception of racial profiling8

3

Kathryn Schellenberg, Policing the Police: Surveillance and Predilection for Leniency,
27 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 667 (2000) (“[p]olice conduct is framed by a rigid quasi-military
command structure, volumes of regulations, and countless edicts dispensed as law.
Paradoxically, however, frontline police officers enjoy a very high level of job discretion and
autonomy”).
4

David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Seredipity: Racial Profiling and
Stops and Searches Without Probable Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 317-18 (2001) and
accompanying footnotes; Kenneth Gavsie, Making the Best of Whren: The Problems with
Pretextual Stops and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 394-401 (1998); State v.
Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), discretionary appeal denied, 635
N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 1994) (“Ohio citizens are being routinely delayed in their travels and being
asked to relinquish to uniformed police officers their right to privacy in their automobiles and
luggage, sometimes for no better reason than to provide an officer the opportunity to ‘practice’
his drug interdiction technique”). The Retherford decision was the direct predecessor of Ohio
v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
5
It should be noted that it is unclear whether the courts are capable of effectively
reforming police traffic enforcement practices. There appears little in the literature concerning
alternative methods of traffic regulation and numerous other factors influence the incentive to
not change the status quo as discussed later in the text of this article.
6
Adero Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 127, 132-33 (2000).
The result reached in Whren is problematic. First, the Court never addressed the
petitioners’ concern that relying on probable cause in the context of pretextual traffic
stops leaves motorists without protection against arbitrary law enforcement. This
decision leaves too much discretion in the hands of police officers. Because of the
lack of resources to fully enforce all the criminal statutes, it follows that police have
broad discretion in police investigations, stops, and arrests. This discretion is at its
greatest when it comes to enforcing traffic regulations and creates the potential for
arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement.
7

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (subjective motivation for traffic stop
not relevant to Fourth Amendment, only whether offense occurred and police had probable
cause to justify conduct relevant); H. Laurence Ross, Folk Crime Revisited, 11 CRIMINOLOGY
71, 78 (1973) (“[i]f police action in traffic cases often seems arbitrary, the courts cannot be
depend upon to rationalize matters at a later stage in the criminal process”). But see, State v.
Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wa.
1999).
8
Margie Paris, A Primer in Profiling: The Merger of Civil Rights and Criminal Defense,
15 FALL CRIM. JUST. 4 (2000) (distinguishing between formal and informal profiling). Formal
refers to a departmental policy while informal refers to profiling based on individual police
discretion. Id. For this Article, since profiling per se is not a central theme to the article, the
term “racial profiling” is intended as a general reference to both forms.
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litigation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The
racial profiling litigation, other than being a relatively new concept,10 has also been
limited to using traffic enforcement as a pretext to find more serious criminal
wrongdoing;11 it has not meaningfully addressed the unequal or selective
enforcement of traffic laws.12 This Article addresses the apparent gap in the legal
and social science literature concerning the unequal enforcement of traffic laws.
How extensive do the police abuse the discretionary powers they are afforded in
enforcing traffic offenses? And what, if any, legal remedies exist, or should exist, to
address the abuse of police discretion in the traffic enforcement context?
II. POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT: THE LAW
The source of police discretion in traffic enforcement and subsequent abuse can
be found in its legislation.13 Traffic laws have been referred to as public welfare
offenses,14 absolute liability offenses,15 and strict liability offenses.16 Whichever

9

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (stating relief from discriminatory traffic enforcement practices
found in Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than in the Fourth
Amendment); Gavsie, supra note 4 at 393.
10

Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling After
Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV.
725 (2000) (stating racial profiling came to the forefront in the last two years of the twentieth
century).
11

Whren, 517 U.S. 806.

12

See, e.g., Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (challenging drug seizures during motor vehicle stops). It
challenged the basis of the stops and the subsequent searches based upon a racial profile but it
did not challenge any disparity in the enforcement of traffic laws. Id.
13
The legislated speed limits and actual human driving behavior makes compliance with
speed laws virtually impossible, or at minimum, very difficult. See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON
& DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARDS THE RATIONAL
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 50 (3d ed. 1989) (“[l]egislatures should redefine the common areas
of selective enforcement in such a way that the police are not delegated the discretion not to
invoke the criminal law”); Gavsie, supra note 4 at 390 ([a] study in Maryland found 93% of
motorists had committed at least one traffic violation on a stretch of highway between
Baltimore and Delaware); Ross, supra note 7 at 83 (when referring to traffic offenses
“[w]idespread violation of novel criminal legislation seems to arise when new behavioral
opportunities are attractive to large numbers of people and where legislation attempting to
control does not integrate with traditional morality”).
14
Randall S. Bate & Dayna E. Mancuso, It’s All about What You Know: the Specific Intent
Standard Should Govern Knowing Violations of the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
304, 313 (2001); Beth Frensilli, Statutory Interpretation of Ambiguous Criminal Statutes: An
Analysis of Title 18, Section 207(c) of the United States Code, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972,
990 (calling traffic and motor vehicle violations public welfare offense).
15

Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 965, 976979 (1993); Gerhard Mueller, How to Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern
Legislators and Traffic Courts, 60 COLUM L. REV. 944, 957 (1960); Ross, supra note 7 at 84
(referring to traffic violations as absolute liability offenses).
16
Douglas Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARIZ. L
REV. 151, 176 (1995) (suggesting that moving violations are generally treated as strict liability
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term is utilized there are no real defenses to a traffic ticket;17 as one commentator
noted, a real defense to a traffic ticket is the driver was someone other than the
defendant.18 There are no real defenses to a strict or absolute liability offense as
there is no mens rea requirement; the act in itself is grounds for conviction.19
Once the police possess probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred they
have the unfettered discretion of whether to stop the motorist,20 to issue a summons
or arrest the suspected traffic offender,21 what ticket or tickets to issue,22 and will
enjoy a virtual guarantee of conviction in court.23 Because the outcome of the
criminal or quasi-criminal process in a traffic case begins and the final outcome of
the case is de facto determined during the stop itself, it is clear that the law governing
the traffic stop is the only law material to the case. In essence, when the police stop
a motorist and issue a summons, any subsequent activity in court is merely a
“fiction,” a process that has no meaning other then the process itself, as the actual
outcome of the case was decided at the conclusion of the traffic stop.24
offenses); Bonnie McGrath, Traffic Practice: Just the Ticket, 9 CHI. BAR ASS’N REC., 25, 26
(1995); Ross, supra note 7 at 76; Kenneth Simons, When is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1082 (1997).
17

The terms “traffic ticket,” “ticket,” “summons,” “citation” and “traffic summons” are
utilized interchangeably and not intended to convey a different meaning.
18

McGrath, supra, note 16 at 25.

19

Id.

20

Whren, 517 U.S. 813. But see, Soto, 734 A.2d 350; Ladson, 979 P.2d 833.

21

The Supreme Court has limited the discretion of police officers to conduct searches
incident to a lawful arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Iowa v. Knowles,
525 U.S. 113 (1998). Yet it has granted extremely broad arrest power. See Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
22
For example, a police officer could potentially issue a summons for speeding, a seatbelt
violation, or perhaps both. In addition, one action may constitute multiple offenses that do not
offend the double jeopardy clause of the Sixth Amendment.
23

As discussed earlier, since traffic violations are strict/absolute liability offenses, there is
no defense, thus making acquittal a virtual impossibility. Mueller, supra note 15 at 960-61,
964; McGrath, supra note 16 at 25.
24

This assertion was largely an analogy drawn from Yale Kamisar “Equal Justice in the
Gatehouse and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from
Escabedo to . . .”. RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE C. THOMAS, THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW,
JUSTICE, AND POLICING (1998). Kamisar’s pivotal work published one year prior to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) critiqued the current jurisprudence on confessions. The
critique stemmed from the fact that the law governing interrogations was applied in the sterile
setting of the court (the mansion), while the true nature of obtaining the confession was taking
place in the gate house (the police station) where far less fashionable practices occurred that
would offend the public conscience. As Kamisar eloquently stated:
In the “gatehouse” of American criminal procedure through which most defendants
journey and beyond which many never may get the enemy of the state is the
depersonalized “subject” to be “sized up” and subjected to interrogation tactics and
techniques most appropriate for the occasion; he is “game” to be stalked and cornered.
Here ideals are checked at the door, “realities” faced, and the prestige of law
enforcement vindicated. Once he leaves the “gatehouse” and enters the “mansion,” if
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Since there are roughly fifty to sixty million traffic filings each year in state
courts,25 and not all traffic stops result in the issuance of a summons,26 it is
reasonably estimated that there are over one hundred million traffic stops each year
in the United States.27 If it were presumed that all of these traffic stops were lawfully
ever he gets there the enemy of the state is repersonalized, even dignified, the public
invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor of individual freedom from law enforcement
celebrated.
Id. at 29-30.
Although Kamisar’s description has little direct bearing to the traffic enforcement
practices of the police and subsequent court appearances it is easily analogized to the traffic
enforcement, traffic court relationship. As noted in the text, infra, traffic enforcement
involves tremendous police discretion. The police, if they observe a violation, decide whether
to stop the motorist, or, if there are multiple motorists, which of the motorists to stop. The
police then decide to which motorists to issue a summons and which summonses to issue.
This all takes place on the roadway where the traffic stop occurred, not in the courtroom. The
suspect certainly has a right to take the ticket to trial and will be afforded at least minimal due
process protections, including the right to counsel and compel witnesses. The defendant will
be treated in a dignified manner and as Kamisar noted, the protections of liberty will be
afforded all of their glory, even if a guilty plea is entered. Yet the fact that the same police
officer allowed twenty other motorists to drive past him at identical speeds without stopping
them, that the same officer allowed ten other motorists to go free without a ticket, and nine
other motorists were issued a summons for the exact same violation will never be an issue
addressed by the court. It is immaterial because all that is relevant is whether the offense was
committed and the police enforced it. Yes, the defendant can have a trial, but the defendant is
convicted before entering the court room—it is a strict liability offense. Thus, most motorists
will simply mail their tickets in and those who do try the case will never prevail because the
ticket is an absolute liability offense. Thus, everything that takes place in the courthouse is
merely a “dressing” for what has already been decided during the stop. Later sections of the
Article will address the empirical evidence of the offensive influences on the use and abuse of
police discretion and why motorists are rightfully outraged when convicted of a traffic
violation.
25

National Center for State Courts, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT,
1991 at 39, table 116 (1993). The following states did not have data available: Tennessee,
Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island, Montana. Puerto Rico was also included in the estimate.
National Center for State Courts, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: NATIONAL STATE COURT CASELOAD
TRENDS, 1984-1993 at 1 (1995).
26

Illya Lichtenberg & Lisa Smith, How Dangerous are Routine Traffic Stops: A Research
Note, 29 JOURNAL OF CRIM. JUST. 419, 423 (2001) (estimating between 33% and 50% of traffic
stops result in a summons); PATRICK LANGAN ET AL., CONTACTS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND
PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY at 2 (2001), available at
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pp99.pdf (finding 52.4% of motor vehicle stops resulted in a
summons being issued); DAVID BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 30 (1994) (stating police
issue a summons in 43% of stops); BROWN, infra note 96, at 227 (finding one in three
motorists receive a summons); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super.1996) (finding 60% of
motorists receive a summons); Gregory M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
551, 556 (2001) (finding that only one of every ten motor vehicle stops result in the issuance
of a summons in Florida). See also note 91, infra, citing numerous state police department
reports indicating that many motorists are released with a warning or no formal legal action at
all.
27
Lichtenberg & Smith, supra note 26, at 422-24 (estimating the number of traffic stops:
low = 60,000,000; middle = 120,000,000; high = 180,000,000).
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supported by probable cause,28 why are so many motoring offenders released without
a ticket or citation and only certain offenders subjected to the quasi-criminal
penalties of traffic enforcement at the discretion of the police?
This Article seeks to explore factors influencing a police officer’s decision to
issue a traffic summons and the legal restraints, or lack thereof, on the use and abuse
of police discretion in traffic enforcement. Because Atwater29 expands the scope of
police discretionary authority in traffic enforcement to include the option of arrest, it
is inferred that the same use-abuse of discretion in issuing a summons can or will be
extended to the arrest,30 non-arrest discretion. Implications are discussed.
III. POLICE DISCRETION IN TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
When the police stop a motorist for a traffic violation, the Fourth Amendment31
requires that the police have cause sufficient to justify32 the seizure33 or any evidence
obtained from the resulting stop will be denied admission at trial.34 Once the police
have successfully overcome the hurdle of justifying the initial stop, few obstacles
remain to hinder further investigation beyond the traffic infraction or in determining
who will and will not be issued, what, if any summons.35 Jumping this initial hurdle
is a rather simple task as virtually every motorist routinely violates a traffic law.36

28
As required by the Fourth Amendment. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); David Harris,
Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 56061 (1998) (noting that probable cause is easy to obtain for traffic offenses because the statutes
are so vast and technical).
29

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)

30
Robert Rigg, The Objective Mind and Search Incident to Citation, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
281, 297-98 (1990) (“[s]earch incident to citation allows unbridled discretion, encourages
already selectively enforced traffic laws to be used as pretexts to search minorities, and uses
searches as a device to punish those suspected of criminal activity rather than seize contraband
or protect officer safety”).
31

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath OR affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons OR things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32

There are numerous methods by which the police may lawfully seize vehicles based on
no suspicion. See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979).
33

The seizure is the initial stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

34

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 644 (1961) (binding the exclusionary rule upon the states to
remedy violations of Fourth Amendment rights); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963) (holding that evidence discovered as a result of unlawful police intrusion inadmissible
as the fruit of a poisonous tree).
35

See notes, infra

36

Lipper, supra note 26 at 556 (“[g]iven that virtually every driver regularly violates one
minor traffic law or another, police officers have nearly unlimited discretion to stop
motorists”); New Jersey Department of Transportation, THE 36-MONTH STUDY REPORT ON 65
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Once a motorist is lawfully stopped, police, without any suspicion beyond the initial
traffic offense, may order a driver37 and passenger38 from the vehicle and request
consent to search the vehicle.39 Consent is virtually always given,40 and the scope of
the search justified by the consent is limited only by what the police are looking
for,41 which is almost always drugs.42 Therefore the police can search anywhere
once consent is obtained.43 In addition, police are not required to inform motorists
that they can refuse consent.44 Furthermore, police may conduct canine “sniff tests”
of the exterior of the motor vehicle.45 They may also issue a summons,46 arrest the

MPH SPEED LIMIT IN NEW JERSEY (2001) (finding a large percentage of motorists violate the
speed limit and an increase in the speed limit did not cause any substantial change in the
average speed of motorists); Gavsie, supra note 4 at 390 (finding 93% of motorists on stretch
of highway between Baltimore and Delaware committed a traffic infraction).
37

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)

38

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).

39

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). It has been demonstrated that verbal
warnings do not increase the rate of refusal. Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects
of Robinette on the ‘Voluntary’ Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOWARD L. J. 349,
366-74 (2001).
40
ILLYA LICHTENBERG, VOLUNTARY CONSENT OR OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE CONSENSUAL POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTER, at 165-98 (1999).
41

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)

42

LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 200

43

Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)

44

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218.

45

LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 280 (motorist who refused consent released only after
Ohio state trooper was informed no canine unit was available); Gavsie, supra note 4, 395-400;
Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, civil action No. CCB-93-468 and MJG-93-468. It has also
been argued that “plain smell” is not a protected interest within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See Jennifer Bradfield, Comment: Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Step
Towards Upholding Suspicionless Dog Sniff Searches in Public Schools, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
475, 491-94 (1997).
46

Because the lawful discretion of police in determining whether to issue a summons to a
motorist is so germane to the entire Article and the authority relied upon is not specific to this
conduct, it will be cited at length from where this contention emerges. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police
have probable cause to believe a traffic offense has occurred . . .Since, they contend,
the use of automobiles is heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with
traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be
able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation.
But only an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as endorsing the
principal that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the
basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. Petitioners
point to our statement that ‘[t]here was no evidence whatsoever that the officer’s
presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to confirm any other previous
suspicion about the occupants’ of the car. . . .
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motorist,47 give a written or verbal warning,48 or do nothing at all.49 If the arrest

Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or
administrative inspection (discussed above), that an officer’s motive invalidates
objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly
held and asserted the contrary. [S]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise
lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional. . . . [T]he fact that the officer does not have
the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. . . .
We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved. We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.
[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions
to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. Moreover, police
enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary
from place to place and from time to time. But we are aware of no principle that
would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so
commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the
lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we
do not know by what standard (or what right) we would decide, as petitioners would
have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit
enforcement.
Whren v. United States, 519 U.S. 806, 810-19 (1996) (citations omitted). This footnote
articulates that the subjective motivation of the police in making a discretionary arrest for a
traffic offense does not offend the Fourth Amendment. As noted at the inception of this
footnote, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the discretionary authority to
issue a summons. The issuance of a summons by the police constitutes an arrest in most
states, but the accused is effectively released on his or her own recognizance (ROR) if not
taken into custody. Thus, the issuance of a ticket can be considered to fall somewhere
between a traffic stop and a full custodial arrest. When considered in conjunction with the
following footnote, it appears that the discretionary authority explicitly afforded to police in
the decision to stop a motorist in Whren and arrest in Atwater is implicitly if not explicitly
extended to the issuance of a ticket or summons. See also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769
(2001), Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
47

Accordingly, we confirm today what our prior cases have intimated: the standard of
probable cause “applie[s] to all arrests without the need to ‘balance’ the interests and
circumstances involved in the particular situations. If an officer has probable cause to
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (citations omitted).
48

Giving a warning to motorists concerning the state’s traffic laws was the practice of
Officer Newsome in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); United States v. New Jersey Civil
Action No. 99-5970 (MLC) FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE AGGREGATE DATA SUBMITTED
PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT DECREE ENTERED INTO BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY REGARDING THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE at
summary table (no page numbers). Of 132,047 stops made in the first four months of 2000
48,667 tickets, 31,321 warnings, and 28,411 summonses and warnings were issued.
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option is selected the police may impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory
search.50 As noted earlier, it is clear that the police often do much more than traffic
enforcement during traffic stops.51 But what restricts these police powers from being
utilized as a pretext for criminal investigation,52 as a means of retaliating against an
uncooperative motorist,53 or simply selectively enforcing the law?54 The answer is
virtually none.55 The recent Atwater decision has effectively gutted the Fourth
Amendment from providing motorists with any protection, and replaced the few
protections that had remained with the discretion of over 650,000 police officers56
making decisions independent of any law57 or rationally based policy.58 As the

49
Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (placing no requirement on the police that enforcement be
uniform when it noted that “police enforcement practices . . . vary from place to place and
time to time”).
50

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), limited by Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 999
(1998); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982)
[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car
has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the
likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its
contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to
obtain a warrant.
51
Whren, 517 U.S. at 816-17 (detectives with departmental guidelines prohibiting them
from engaging in routine traffic enforcement do not offend Fourth Amendment when
guidelines not followed).
52
The issue of racial profiling has been repeatedly analyzed in many law reviews and
therefore is addressed only briefly in a later section.
53
Black, infra note 116, at 36 (“[j]ust as an argumentative driver is more likely to receive a
traffic ticket, so an uncooperative adult or juvenile in any kind of incident is more likely to be
arrested”); LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 278-82 (discussing the consequences of refusing to
consent.).
54

See Whren, 517 U.S. at 806; Atwater v. City of LagoVista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).

55
Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an Exclusionary
Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107 (2001) (“[i]n perhaps no
setting does law enforcement possess greater discretion than in the decision to conduct a
traffic stop . . .”); Gavsie, supra note 4, at 390; Jernigan, supra note 6, at 132-33; Wesley
MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal
Remedies to Racial Profling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (2000) (“[c]urrently law effectively
permits officers to search the car of any person they observe committing a traffic offense”);
Peter Shakow, Let He Who has Never Turned Without Signaling Cast the First Stone: An
Analysis of Whren v. United States, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 627, 633 (1997) (“[a]lmost everyone in
the country with a driver’s license could be stopped at almost anytime, were the police
inclined to vigorously enforce every violation”).
56

CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2000 (2002) at 322, table 74. There were 637,551 sworn
police officers and 261,567 civilian police employees in the United States, not including
federal law enforcement officers. Sworn police personnel are generally distinguished from
civilian personnel by the power to arrest and/or carry a firearm.
57

David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the ‘New
Federalism’ in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 375 (2001)
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remainder of this Article will argue, Whren and Atwater essentially expanded police
discretion beyond all notions of decency,59 not for the purpose of discretionary
enforcement, but to discretionarily impose punishment.60 The only questions
remaining are how and when this discretion is abused and against whom?61
A. Whren and Atwater62
At first glance, Atwater may seem to be nothing more than a continuation of a
conservative Supreme Court’s narrowing of the Fourth Amendment protections
afforded to citizens.63 When examined closely, it becomes clear that the Atwater
decision makes the Fourth Amendment obsolete in motor vehicle stops absent some
protection afforded by a particular state through statute or interpretation of its own
constitution.64 Atwater also effectively reverses the impact of recent efforts to
reform questionable police practices in conducting searches based upon consent
which has been inextricably tied into the controversy of racial profiling.65 The

(Whren held that “any time the officer observed a traffic offense this constituted probable
cause, and the actual motivation for the stop not traffic enforcement, but something else
entirely did not matter”).
58

Whren, 517 U.S. at 814-15 (holding that departmental guidelines prohibiting specific
police assignment from working traffic detail is legally unenforceable).
59
Prior law reviews have claimed, rightfully so, that the police were using traffic stops as a
pretext for criminal investigation prior to Whren. Whren merely institutionalized or legally
authorized a practice that law enforcement was already openly using. Craig Glantz, Could
This be the End of Fourth Amendment Protections for Motorists?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 864, 883 (1997).
60

See text supra notes 13-30, discussing the implications of strict-absolute liability in the
discretionary enforcement of traffic offenses.
61
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J concurring) (“in Atwater,
which recognized no constitutional limitation on arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor offense,
this Court relied in part on a perceived ‘dearth of horribles demanding redress . . . I hope the
Court’s perception proves correct. But if it does not, if experience demonstrates anything like
an epidemic of unnecessary arrest,’ I hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent”
(citations omitted)).
62
Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion shortly after Atwater, indicated that the
Atwater decision was based upon the presumption that police would not abuse the arrest
discretion they were afforded. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 773.
63

Harris, supra note 57, at 367.
Little wonder, then, that when the Court shifted toward a more conservative view of
criminal defendants’ rights, it is not surprising that a least one commentator criticized
this a ‘revolution to the right.’ . . .While we can debate the magnitude of this
conservative shift, the direction was unquestionably away from the protection of the
criminal defendants’ rights and toward a more expansive view of police and
prosecutorial power.
Id.
64

See Michigan v. Long, 436 U.S. 1032 (1983); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975);
Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771.
65

Rudovsky, supra note 4, at 297-304.
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following briefly discusses the major holding of the Atwater and Whren decisions
and then focuses upon its practical impact on motor vehicle searches.
The Atwater Court held that police had the discretionary authority to arrest or not
arrest a suspect for a minor traffic violation,66 such as failing to wear a seatbelt,67 if
they possessed probable cause to believe that such an offense had in fact been
committed.68 Essentially, the Whren decision permitted police to selectively stop
motorists unabatedly, providing there was independent evidence amounting to
probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred.69 The subjective motivation for
the stop was irrelevant;70 only some objective justification need be present.71 The
abuse of police discretion in deciding whether or not to issue a summons is also
unreviewable by the courts.72 Awater, in effect, permits police officers to not just
utilize their unreviewable discretion to issue a traffic summons but also provides the
police with the discretionary authority to make an arrest or not, a far more intrusive
seizure73 than a motor vehicle stop.74 A lawful arrest creates a situation where police
have virtually no restraints on their search power during motor vehicle stops.75 The
police can conduct a search of the person arrested76 and the motor vehicle, provided
the actual arrest takes place.77 Since the operator of the vehicle was arrested, the
police may also seize the vehicle.78 A lawfully impounded vehicle is then subject to
a discretionary inventory search,79 thus permitting the police to search the entire
66

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (“[t]he question is whether the
Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a
misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by fine. We hold that it does not”).
67

Id. at 1553.

68

Id. at 1557.

69

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[w]e think these cases foreclose any
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved”).
70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Slobogin & Schumacer, Rating the Intrusiveness of Police Search and Seizure Practices,
17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1993) (finding judicial perceptions of the intrusiveness of
searches and seizures varies from perceptions of students and law enforcement).
74

Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).

75

There does not appear to be a willingness on the part of the courts to extend the wingspan restrictions of Chimel to motor vehicle stops. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367
(1987); Michigan v. Long, 436 U.S. 1032 (1983).
76
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Terry v. Ohio, 301 U.S. 1 (1968).
77

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752; Knowles, 525 U.S. at 113.

78

The only limitation placed upon the police by the Court is Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S.
113 (1998) (restricting the discretion of the police in conducting a search incident to a lawful
arrest when no arrest has occurred).
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contents of the vehicle.80 Essentially the police could simply search the entire person
and their vehicle as a search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest81 and conduct an inventory
search82 rendering the need to obtain consent or a warrant to search unnecessary.83
The remainder of the Article is devoted to analyzing what police have done with the
expansive discretion afforded to them in traffic enforcement and what Whren and
Atwater can be predicted to bring in the future.
IV. POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT: PRACTICE
The review of the policing literature on traffic enforcement is broken into three
areas: 1) The scope of the police discretion in traffic enforcement; 2) how motorist
conduct during the traffic stop may influence the use-abuse of police discretion; and
3) factors influencing the use of police discretion that are unrelated to the conduct of
the motorist during the stop, highway safety,84 or the legislative intent of traffic
related statutes.85
A. The Scope of Police Discretion in Traffic Stops
“What is the law? Is it what the police enforce and what the people probably
think is the law, or is it the command of the legislature?”86
The majority of traffic tickets are issued by police officers.87 Law enforcement
being the primary means in which traffic enforcement is undertaken, it should first
be noted that most traffic violations do not come to the attention of the police.88
79

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367.

80

Id.

81

Subject, of course, to the nominal restrictions of Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 113 (1999).

82

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367.

83

LICHTENBERG, supra note 40, at 280 (finding 95% of motorists give consent); WAYNE
LAFAVE, TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 596 (3d ed. 1996). LaFave sarcastically
notes the so-called consent search. Id. The dubious nature in which police obtain consent to
search a vehicle seems to suggest the collateral search powers incident to Atwater may have
pre-existed Atwater in practice, but only de facto in legal application.
84
Ross, supra, note 7, at 77 (finding the average driver commits nine driving errors every
five minutes in urban settings).
85

AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 143 (1992). “However zealous
the police may be in their attempts to perform traffic duties adequately, they are universally
handicapped by the prevailing and unfortunate misconception that rigid enforcement will
bring about the greatest returns in public safety on the streets and highways.” Id.
86

Elder, infra note 209, at 850.

87

Some traffic tickets are initiated by citizens filing complaints. The specific number is
unknown, but it is assumed that this practice does not account for more than a small
percentage of all traffic violations processed in state courts.
88
Ross, supra note 7, at 83-84 (“[r]elatively few offenders are apprehended”); Gavisie,
(“because driving codes are typically so extensive that no driver can travel three blocks
without violating the law in at least some small way”); Smith, infra note 89; Schellenberg,
supra note 3, at 668 (“[d]iscretion is also inherent due to the sheer impossibility of enforcing
every law to the extent allowed”).
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Even if traffic violations are witnessed by the police, they are often either
overlooked89 or unenforced.90 When traffic offenses are observed and the motorist
stopped there is little to suggest that enforcement is uniform,91 fair,92 or done to serve
some public interest,93 if there is any enforcement at all.94 “For the big-city police
have always done more than just enforce laws, keep the peace, and serve the public.

89
BRUCE SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES at 65 (1949) (“[m]ost violations
are not observed by enforcement officers and most of those that do come to the attention of the
police are ignored, tolerated or condoned for various reasons”).
90

Rudovsky, supra note 4, at 318; Elder, infra note 209, at 842-43; Shakow, supra note 55,
at 633 (“[a]lmost everyone in the country with a driver’s license could be stopped at almost
anytime, were the police inclined to rigorously enforce every violation”); MICHAEL PIKE, THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLICING 66 (1985) (“there is considerable scope for individual discretion since
some officers may choose to ignore the offence or to deal with it informally”).
91
See United States v. New Jersey Civil Action No. 99-5970 (MLC) FIRST SEMIANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AGGREGATE DATA SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT DECREE ENTERED
INTO BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY REGARDING THE
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE at summary table (no page numbers). Of 132,047
stops made in the first four months of 2000, 48,667 tickets, 31,321 warnings, and 28,411
summonses and warnings were issued. Id. In 1998 the Colorado State Patrol issued 143,702
traffic citations, 38,560 seat belt citations, and 30,020 warning tickets, this data does not
include traffic stops where the Colorado State Patrol issued no summons or warning.
COLORADO STATE PATROL: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (see 1998 Statistical Overview: Colorado
State Patrol Activities, 1998). The Pennsylvania State Police, although not offering
information on total stops or warnings does provide information on actions of some
specialized divisions. Troop C’s Centipede and TAG-D enforcement division issued 3,998
traffic citations and 1,727 warnings in 2,686 man hours (at 42). The Troop E bicycle patrol
issued nineteen written warnings and issued two traffic citations (at 45). I-78 Coalition
Enforcement Efforts included 4,643 traffic citations and 5,687 warnings (at 49).
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT; The Michigan State Police reported for
the year 2000 that 255,954 tickets were issued and 308,718 verbal warnings were given
totaling 564,672 stops. MICHIGAN STATE POLICE: YEAR 2000 -STATEWIDE REPORT TOTALS TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY at 6. The Ohio Highway Patrol reports similar figures. In
2000 they made 436,477 speeding arrests, 194,321 seat belt arrests, and issued 413,195 traffic
warnings. OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL ACTIVITY SUMMARY 1994-2000; Gregory M. Lipper
Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. on LEGIS. 551, 556. “[P]olice spend a great deal of time pulling
over drivers even when there are no charges filed against them. In Florida, for instance, only
ten percent of the thirty-two to thirty-five million traffic stops each year result in tickets.”;
Matthew T. Zingraff, et al., EVALUATING NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY PATROL DATA:
CITATIONS, WARNINGS, AND SEARCHES IN 1998 REPORT SUBMITTED TO: NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL & PUBLIC SAFETY AND NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY
PATROL at table 1 (2000). North Carolina reported 651,576 total citations issued and 325,331
total warnings issued in 1998.
92

Holland, supra note 55, at 1107.

93

MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES 13 (1980) (“[s]treet level bureaucrats [such as the police] make policy in two
related aspects. They exercise wide discretion in decisions about citizens with whom they
interact. Then, when taken in concert, their individual actions add up to agency behavior”).
94

SMITH, supra note 89, at 87.
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They have also decided, or at least helped to decide, which laws to enforce, whose
peace to keep, and which public to serve.”95
Aside from deciding when, where and which laws to enforce, many police
officers question whether traffic regulation should even be part of their job.96 As one
study noted, in small police departments the majority of police supervisors felt traffic
enforcement was not part of a patrolman’s duties,97 while in a large city all of the
supervisors felt traffic was not part of a patrolman’s duties.98 Thus, organizational
influences can have a large impact on traffic enforcement practices of departments.
These organizational influences manifest themselves in the individual enforcement
behavior of police officers.
Many persons who are stopped by police for a traffic violation do not even
receive a ticket because the police choose to deal with the offense informally99 or
ignore100 it altogether. Other studies on police traffic enforcement have found similar
results.101 One study found the police issued a summons in thirty-three percent of
traffic stops;102 another found that forty-three percent of stops resulted in a ticket;103
while another national study estimated that 54.2% of stops result in a summons.104
“Many more drivers who violate the rules of the road are stopped and warned than
are cited or arrested.”105 Based on this finding, it is reasonable to assume that police
officers are selective in traffic enforcement decisions not just in making stops and
conducting searches, but also in issuing summonses. This raises concerns of what
criteria police officers employ when deciding to issue tickets for traffic violations.106

95

ROBERT FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 12 (1977).

96

MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFORM 261 (1981) (“[w]hen asked if patrolmen should enforce traffic laws, at least a third
and as many as two-fifths of the field supervisors in small departments took the position that
patrolmen should not work traffic. By comparison, none of the field supervisors in the LAPD
took this position”).
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

PIKE, supra note 90, at 66.

100

ALBERT J.REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 89 (1977). “[T]o control traffic often
entails ignoring moving violations . . .”.
101
DANIEL B. KENNEDY & ROBERT J.HOMANT, POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 86 (1985)
(“the data show that [the police] had many more occasions for issuing a ticket than they
used”); Lichtenberg & Smith, supra note 26, at 423 (estimating that 33% to 50% of motorists
stopped receive a summons).
102

BROWN, supra note 96, at 227 (“[o]f all those individuals they stopped for a minor
violation, only one-third were cited or arrested”).
103

DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 30 (1994) (“[i]n traffic stops it was found
that ‘43% of the time they issue a citation’”).
104

LANGAN, supra note 26; see also BAYLEY, supra note 103.

105

HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING 136 (1990).

106

The following sections address this issue in detail.
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The research on the exercise of discretion in issuing citations does not support the
view that most traffic summonses are based on public safety criteria.107 Rather, the
literature indicates that police officers’ decisions to issue traffic tickets to motorists
are strongly related to other factors remotely related or unrelated to the issue of
public safety. The following sections provide explanations for police behavior in
citation decision making that do not include public safety108 and several reasons why
officers do not issue citations when in fact public safety may be important.109
B. Conduct of the Motorist During the Traffic Stop
It is well established in the policing literature that the use of police discretion,
especially for minor offenses, is influenced, if not dictated, by the conduct of the
offender-suspect during the encounter.110 In the Whren-Atwater context this section
offers the most compelling empirical evidence that the potential for police to abuse
the discretionary authority in traffic stops is extreme and far more than the “dearth of
horribles” suggested by the Atwater Court.111
C. Demeanor
The policing literature confirms that a citizen's demeanor is a contributing if not
the primary causal factor in the police officer’s decision to issue a citation for a
moving violation.112 “The existing answer is that when offenders are impolite, police
get angry and then they get even. . . . From this perspective, the manifest purpose of
an arrest or ticket is to punish an impolite offender for being in ‘contempt of cop’.”113
107
In a review of the literature, there was no evidence that training of police officers
involved any attempt at teaching police to make independent determinations of a particular
act’s threat to public safety. Therefore, it is questionable whether police are capable of
performing the traffic enforcement function and actually accomplishing a public safety
objective.
108

The literature review is not intended to convey the perception that police do not enforce
traffic laws when there is an egregious violation of the traffic laws that poses an immediate
and clear threat to public safety, it is intended to address the routine traffic stop. It should also
be noted that the section on those who are largely immune from the law suggests that even for
egregious violations of the traffic laws, certain citizens are exempted from enforcement.
109

Id.

110

LAPINSKY, supra note 93, at 31-32
[The police] tend to be lenient with offenders whose attitudes and demeanor denote
penitence but harsh and punitive to those offenders who show signs of disrespect.
Indeed policemen often appear to test the extent to which an offender respects police
authority in order to determine whether he or she is likely to have an improper attitude
and therefore more likely to resist authority.

Id.
111

532 U.S. 318 at 353.

112
Black, infra note 116, at 36 (“[i]n a study of police patrol work in three cities, only 11%
of ‘antagonistic’ drivers were released without being ticketed or arrested, whereas the
proportion rose to 35% of drivers who were ‘civil’ and to 49% of those who were ‘very
deferential’”).
113

Richard J. Lundman, Demeanor or Crime? The Midwest City Police-Citizen Encounters
Study 32 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 647 (1994).
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As one police officer stated “[p]eople write their own tickets. They really do. Your
conduct to me will predict how I'll act to you. The ultimate outcome of that traffic
stop is always in your hands. Your attitude writes your ticket.”114 Behavior
triggering the use of police discretion is not limited to how the citizen responds115 to
the police officer; the citizen is expected to cooperate.116 Being abusive117 or
disrespectful to the police increases the likelihood of receiving a summons. Police
have been known to conduct “attitude tests” of motorists that help them decide
whether or not to issue a summons.118 In the 1950s investigators found that the most
frequent reason cited why police officers used force against a citizen was because
they had shown disrespect for the police.119 It has also been suggested that being in
“contempt of cop” elicits a form of “blue justice,” which includes a traffic citation.120
Thus, the personal contact between the police officer and the motorist is perhaps the
single most influential factor triggering enforcement121 or leniency.122 “[I]f the driver
makes the officer angry, what might have been a simple infraction can become
costly.”123 The driver’s character may influence leniency by police.124 Protesting
innocence has been noted to increase the probability of a summons.125 It has also

114

Connie Fletcher, PURE COP: COP TALK FROM THE STREET TO THE SPECIALIZED UNITS at
249 (1991).
115
PIKE, supra note 90, at 67 (“the interaction between the police officer and the offender
or suspected offender will affect the manner in which the officer exercises his discretion”).
116

DONALD J. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 35-36 (1980) (“[w]hen
the police stop an automobile, whether they give a ticket may depend on not only upon who
the driver is but also upon how he or she behaves: All else constant, the likelihood of a ticket
varies inversely with the degree to which the driver cooperates”).
117

JOHN A. GARDINER, TRAFFIC AND THE POLICE: VARIATIONS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
POLICY 151 (1969) (“[p]ersons who have been abusive to officers, as we have noted, are more
likely than others to receive a ticket. . .”); BLACK, supra note 116, at 36; see also
Schellenberg, supra note 3, at 671.
118

MICHAEL P. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY 13 (1964).

119

William A. Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. SOC. 38, table 1 (1953).

120

MIKE ROTHMILLER & IVAN G. GOLDMAN, L.A. SECRET POLICE: INSIDE THE LAPD ELITE
SPY NETWORK 37 (1992).
121

GEORGE T. PAYTON, PATROL PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT CONCEPTS 60 (6th ed.
1982). “Traffic enforcement is strongly dependent upon personal contact between the patrol
officer and the violator . . . any failure to show respect toward an officer increases the
likelihood of a ticket.” BLACK, supra note 116, at 36.
122

BAYLEY, supra note 103, at 29 “Ever since God investigated Adam, policemen have
performed ‘attitude tests.’” “The action policeman take after stopping a motoring offender is
often influenced by the demeanor of the driver.” “Leniency [in traffic situations] is also
affected by their reading of the character of the drivers.”
123

Id. at 30.

124

Id. at 29. “Leniency is also affected by their reading of the character of the drivers.” Id.

125

BLACK, supra note 116, at 36.
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been found that irregular movements in a car, without relevance to public safety,
increase the probability of being stopped.126
Political affiliation or sponsorship of an unpopular group may instigate a ticket if
publicly displayed.127 One insightful study128 involved fifteen people who had not
received a traffic citation in the past twelve months and who promised to drive safely
during the study period and obey all traffic laws.129 They placed bumper stickers on
their cars stating “BLACK PANTHERS.”130 Within seventeen days there were
thirty-three citations issued to the participants. Some of the stories were
exceptional.131
The influence of a motorist’s demeanor in the police officer’s decision to issue a
summons is well supported by the literature. When expanded to include references
to questioning a police officer’s authority in general,132 the amount of supporting
literature becomes astronomical.133
126

BAYLEY, supra note 116, at 30 (“drivers who speed are more likely to be stopped if they
appear furtive, avert their faces from the police car, or are arrogant and sassy”).
127
The influence of being disrespectful to the police and posting unpopular signs or
bumper stickers on a motor vehicle triggering a police officer to issue a summons raises
serious issues surrounding the First Amendment that are not addressed in this article.
128

F. K. Heussenstamm, Bumper Stickers and the Cops, 8 TRANS-ACTION 32, at 33.

129

Id.

130

Id. “Bumper stickers in lurid day-glow orange and black, depicting a menacing panther
with large BLACK PANTHER lettering were attached to the rear bumper of each subject car
and the study began.” Id.
131

Id.
The first student received a ticket for making an ‘incorrect lane change’ on the
freeway less than two hours after heading home in the rush hour traffic. Five more
tickets were received by others on the second day for ‘following too closely,’ ‘failing
to yield the right of way,’ ‘driving too slowly in the high-speed lane of the freeway,’
‘failure to make proper signal before turning right at an intersection,’ and ‘failure to
observe proper safety of pedestrians using a crosswalk.’ On day three, students were
cited for ‘excessive speed, ‘making unsafe lane changes,’ and ‘driving erratically.’
And so it went on every day. One student was forced to drop out of the study by day
four, because he had already received three citations. Three others reached what we
had agreed was the maximum limit-three citations- within the first week. Altogether,
the participants received 33 citations in 17 days, and the violations fund was
exhausted.
This research had some additional findings that were exceptional. For example, one
student received his second traffic ticket while on his way to pay the first. Id. Another
pertinent finding was that race, sex, ethnicity nor personal appearance seemed to have an
impact. Id.
132
Personal communication with several New Jersey State Troopers in 2001 revealed there
is an informal policy to ticket motorists who refuse to confess to violating the speeding laws,
while motorists who confess are usually let go without a ticket.
133

Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Disrespect as Catalyst for Brutality, N.Y. TIMES Nov.
19, 1997, at A1. Compare this to the circumstances in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49
(1979) where Brown “refused to identify himself and angrily asserted that the officers had no
right to stop him.” Brown was frisked and ultimately arrested for failing to produce
identification; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389-390 (1989) (plaintiff, seeking relief for
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D. Factors Unrelated to the Motorist’s Conduct Influencing Police Discretion
In this section, factors that may influence the use of police discretion that are
unrelated to the conduct of the motorist during the stop are reviewed. There are
varying factors that may influence police decision making that have nothing to do
with the motorist or his or her conduct. Many of these factors are related to
organizational expectations of the police and the ease at which certain geographical
or architectural short-comings make meeting organizational expectations easier.
Other factors examined include certain immutable personal characteristics134 such as
race and age.135 Finally, the privileged and those not subject to traffic law
enforcement are examined.
E. Quotas, Shifts, and Dates
Often the police enforce the traffic laws because of formal departmental
expectations, quotas, or informal means such as an "unstated" quota or minimum
number of violations written if promotion is expected.136 Viewed in this way, the
police administrator creating the quota is the complaining party while the patrolman
police abuses through a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 action, had his face slammed against a the hood of
his vehicle for requesting sugar for his diabetes after being told to shut up); PETER K.
MANNING, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING 231 (1977); JAMES WILSON, VARIETIES OF
POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 33 (1969);
JAMES RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 196 (1974); JOSEPH FINK & LLOYD
SEALY, THE COMMUNITY AND THE POLICE--CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 5, 16-17 (1974); Ralph
Juhnke & Julia Bermann, Police Discretion: Relations of Experience to Officers’ Beliefs and
Arrest Decision, 12 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 243, 248 (1998)(finding experienced officers felt
strongly that persons who challenge their authority should be arrested); STEVEN M. COX &
JACK D. FITZGERALD, POLICE IN COMMUNITY RELATIONS: CRITICAL ISSUES 17 (1983); Stephen
Mastrofski, et al., Compliance on Demand: The Publics Response to Specific Police Requests,
33 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELIQUENCY (1996); PETER SCHARF & ARNOLD BINDER, THE
BADGE AND THE BULLET: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 46 (1983). ROTHMILLER &
GOLDMAN, supra note 120, at 47 (1992); Richard Lundman, Demeanor and Arrest: Additional
Evidence From Previously Unpublished Data 33 J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 306, 308-309
(1996); JEROME SKOLNICK & JAMES FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW (1993) at 103; PIKE, supra note 90,
at 67; Albert J. Reiss, Police Brutality--Answers to Key Questions, 8 TRANS-ACTION 10, 18
(1968); EGON BITTNER, FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 74 (1976); SIDNEY
HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICA 1865-1915 189 (1983).
“‘Your name’. Raymond gave his name. ‘Take the cigarette out of your mouth when your
talking to me,’ the policeman said gruffly. Raymond hesitated, glanced at me, and kept the
cigarette in his mouth. The policeman promptly swung his arm and gave him a good smack of
the left cheek.” (Camus is a fictional account). ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER 45 (Stuart
Gilbert tans., New York, A.A. Knopg 1946) (1942).
134

Immutable characteristics cannot be changed.

135

It should be noted that age is generally not considered an immutable characteristic
because it changes with time. Thus, a child cannot challenge a lack of voting rights because
he or she will be relieved of the burden upon reaching a certain age. Yet in this article, it is
argued that if age influences the level of traffic enforcement it has a far graver consequence,
namely that the young person is subject to differential levels of enforcement which offend the
Equal Protection Clause.
136

Lundman, supra note 113, at 164 (noting that the decision to issues a summons varied
depending upon high or low quota saliency).
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simply selects the defendant.137 When analyzed in this form a quota becomes the
starting point for the abuse of police discretion.138 If the police are organizationally
required to write a certain number of tickets to fill a quota the number of motorists to
be subject to legally scrutiny is fixed; however, the selection of the motorists is left
to the officer’s individual discretion.139 Although it might be suspected that many
police officers, if faced with a quota, might only enforce the most egregious
violations of the traffic code, such has not always been the case.140 There are often
individual rewards available to police officers for writing traffic tickets.141 In
addition, ticket writing is an easy-to-measure method of tracking an officer’s
performance,142 compared to often difficult-to-measure police functions such as the
prevention of crime. During the enforcement of minor violations such as traffic
enforcement, departmental policy will have the greatest influence on the degree of
enforcement.143 A study of eight communities’ traffic enforcement practices found
that departmental policy or practices of an individual administrator determined the
level of enforcement.144 Other research has found micro management going as far as
to expect two tickets per hour from patrolmen.145

137
BLACK, supra note 116, at 33. “Their usual policy is to ticket only as many drivers as
their supervisors demand, and to relax after this so-called quota has been filled . . . . In effect,
then, police supervisors act as complainants in most traffic work, but, within limits, they leave
to the officers the selection of cases to be treated as offenses.” Id.
138

Lundman, supra note 113, at 644. “[B]ut the interaction of Quota and Class is
significant in all models. . . .” (thus noting that how police discretion is exercised when
responding to a quota can be a singificant source of class discrimination).
139
Lundman, The Traffic Violator: Organizational Norms THE AMBIVALENT FORCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICE (Arthur Niederhoffer et al. ed. 1976) at 117. “Most generalists
[patrolman] either do the minimum enforcement required by their supervisors or pay attention
only to egregious violations of traffic rules. . . .” Citation quotas, however, only direct patrol
officers to issue a certain number of traffic tickets. They do not determine the types of
individuals to whom will be issued in order to meet organizational expectations. Id.
140
DAVID H. BAYLEY, MODERN POLICING: CRIME
VOL. 15 at 524. (Michael Tonry et al. eds, 1992)

AND JUSTICE

A REVIEW

OF

RESEARCH

141

HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 168 (1977). “Police units are rewarded
for the number of traffic citations issued.” Id.
142

REISS, supra note 100, at 7 (“on the other hand, higher priority was given to other police
business, such as writing a traffic ticket (usually to fill one’s ticket quota)”).
143
James Q. Wilson, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND
ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 49 (1968). “The level of enforcement on minor police-invoked
rules- traffic rules, for example- will depend on departmental policy almost entirely. . . .”
144

Id. at 95. (“The rate at which traffic tickets are issued varies enormously among the
eight police departments and this variation is primarily the result of policies of the
administrator, not the characteristics of the community.”)
145

Id. at 97. “In Oakland, the members of the traffic division are expected to write 2
tickets per man hour.” PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT at 42. Troop C’s
Centipede and TAG-D enforcement division issued 3,998 traffic citations and 1,727 warnings
in 2,686 man hours an average of 2.13 tickets or warnings per hour.
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In addition to the existence of traffic quotas fueling traffic enforcement within
police departments is the fact that many police administrators deny their existence.146
Among patrolman in large urban police departments it is well known there is no
quota, but if they wish to keep a seat in a radio car they will empty one ticket book
each month.147 Some police traffic ticket writing practices have been described as
norms,148 while others simply state that the police write as many tickets as the
administrators encourage them to write.149
Income that municipalities derive from tickets150 has also shown to be a major
bargaining tool for police unions.151 The “blue flu”152 can not just slow down vital
police services, but can also slow down income derived from the use of the criminal
justice system in the form of ticket writing.153 For example, during a two month
period in Detroit, police used the “blue flu” combined with a slow down in ticket
writing, ultimately resulting in pay increases and enhanced fringe benefit packages
for patrolmen.154 New York had an experience similar to that of Detroit; patrolmen

146
Id. at 96-97. (“Almost no police administrator will admit he sets a traffic ticket quota
the one who came closest insisted on calling it a ‘norm’.”)
147

PAUL RAGONESE & BERRY STAINBACH, THE SOUL OF A COP 33 (1991). Pushing police
to enforce traffic in this manner is very Orwellian. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 63
(1946). “Throughout the Spring and Summer they worked a sixty-hour week, and in August
Napoleon announced that there would be work on Sunday afternoons as well. This work was
strictly voluntary, but any animal who absented himself from it would have his rations reduced
by half.” Id.
148

John R.Taylor, Traffic Citation Quotas: Fact or Fiction, 40 POLICE CHIEF 34 (Feb.
1993). (“Yes, officers are required to write citations. But this requirement is not an ironclad
‘quota’ or absolute number . . . rather there is a norm.”)
149
GARDINER, supra note 117, at 90.
encourage them to write.”

“The policemen write as many tickets as you

150

The income derived by municipalities from traffic and parking tickets is frequently
factored into their budgets. See Beth Kormanik, 1 Million Parking Tickets Expected; 2001
total would be record for City, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL Aug. 17, 2001, at P 01B;
Kevin Flynn, Turning the Meters; Webb Budget in ‘02 Calls for Parking to Generate
Additional $12.1 Million, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 11, 2002 at 4A; Michael Saul, Mike
Unveils Budget Full of Painful Cuts: Hikes cig tax, nicks cops, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 14, 2002, at
3; Eric Weiss & Tom Puleo, Audit Faults Parking Enforcement, THE HARTFORD COURANT,
Apr. 4, 2001, at A3; Mueller, supra note 15, at 946; Ross Netherton, Fair Trial in Traffic
Court, 41 MINN. L. REV. 577, 588 (1957) (citing that most violations bureaus seem to exist for
the purpose of generating revenue).
151
Harvey Juris & Peter Feville, POLICE UNIONISM: POWER AND IMPACT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR
BARGAINING 86-87 (1973).
152

The “blue flu” is a general reference to abnormally high rates of absenteeism. Usually
used in place of a strike since it is unlawful for the police to strike.
153

Id.

154

Id. (“In May and June 1967 Detroit patrolmen conducted a traffic ticket slowdown and
‘blue flu’ to put pressure on the city in contract negotiations and as a response to what
patrolmen perceived as undue pressure to increase city revenues by writing large numbers of
tickets.”)
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issued no parking or traffic tickets and had a high absentee rate resulting in
beneficial contract negotiations.155 The goal of promoting public safety can be
subverted by the goal of merely writing tickets to achieve some end other than public
safety.156 As the prior two examples have illustrated, this practice can be far more
than the conduct of individual officers, it can be institutionalized by collective
bargaining units.
Officers who must meet a quota, informal or formal, have been known to reject
the required number of citations that must be issued and meet the required number of
tickets by issuing all the summonses at one point in their shift157 or at a certain point
in the month.158 Thus, motorists who are subjected to discretionary enforcement may
simply have just been in the wrong place at the wrong time, literally.
F. Easy Targets and “Duck Ponds”
Police officers are also known to select easy targets for finding traffic violations
regardless of an officer’s opinion of the seriousness of an offense or public safety
implications. A tricky intersection159 or a location where signs are hard to read160
have been noted as popular locations for police to wait and find traffic offenders.161
Similar instances have been observed concerning artificially low speed limits.162

155

Id. at 87. “Patrolmen issued no traffic or parking tickets” together with a much higher
than average absentee rate, this practice resulted in an agreement more beneficial to the
patrolmen.
156

This commonly referred to as “goal displacement” in management.

157

BLACK, supra note 116, at 33 (“[a] common practice was to write a ticket at the
beginning of their shifts so they could forget about traffic violations for the next 7 hours”).
158

Lundman, supra note 113, at 118. “In practice, many patrol officers resisted quotas by
postponing ‘working traffic’ until the later portions of each month. They then worked
aggressively to meet their quotas.”
159

JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 55 (2nd ed. 1975).
The traffic cyclist waits in hiding for moving violators near a tricky intersection, and is
reasonably sure that such violations will occur with regularity. . . . You learn to sniff
out places where you can catch violators when your running behind [on writing
tickets]. Of course the department gets to know that you hang around one place, and
they sometimes try to repair the situation there. But a lot of the time it would be too
expensive to fix up the engineering fault, so we keep making our norm.
160
BLACK, supra note 116, at 33 (“[i]n one precinct in Detroit, for example, a number of
officers favored an intersection where it was unusually difficult for drivers to read the sign
“reading ‘no left turn’. A good duck pond such as this will yield a ticket within a few
minutes”).
161

Whether such practices amount to entrapment may be an interesting topic for a law
review.
162

H. Laurence Ross, Folk Crime Revisited 11 CRIMINOLOGY at 78.
[The police] looked for speeding -in their words, the bread and butter of traffic law
enforcement- they drove their patrol cars, not in central London where congestion
meant that it was virtually impossible to speed nor on roads with adequate speed
limits, but rather on multi-lane limited-access highways, especially on those parts with

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003

21

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

446

[Vol. 50:425

Police know where to find minor violators, especially traffic, whenever they desire to
discover such offenses.163
When roadway engineering, artificially low speed limits, or laws that cannot be
complied with regardless of how much care is used by the motorist164 are the cause of
a traffic violation it inevitably leads to outrage from the common motorists.165 For
many Americans it may serve as a challenge to defy, conspire against, or perhaps
impede enforcement.166
V. IMMUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE
A. Age
When issuing traffic citations, police may also discriminate against youthful
drivers. As one researcher noted the two groups who are “[s]ystematically
discriminated against regarding traffic”167 are teenagers and persons abusive to the
police.168 Research on perceptions of police legitimacy appear to fit well with this
assertion. Young people view the police as far less legitimate than do older
people.169 This perception may at least be in part justified, as evidence suggests, that
police treat younger motorists more harshly.170

30- and 40-mile speed limits, which appeared far too low in light of the roadway
engineering and which were violated by large numbers of motorists.
163

REISS, supra note 100, at 6. “[T]he patrol officer has specific knowledge of places he
has been, trouble spots, a few known persons, the best places to pick up ‘movers’ (moving
traffic violations).”
164

Mueller, supra note 15, at 960.
Or take the case of the driver who checks his tail lights before departure and finds they
are operating. Later he is stopped by the highway police because his tail lights are off.
Of course, the driver could not know his tail lights were off. But by punishing him
nevertheless for intentionally driving without tail lights we shall happily succeed in
frustrating the good man.
Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 560.
165

Mueller, supra note 15, at 946, 952.

166

Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 560.
There are some traffic regulations that offend our common sense as, for example, a
20-mile zone on a divided four lane concrete highway where the flow of traffic is light
and where there is no visible reason for any such speed restriction. To an American
individualist such a seemingly unreasonable regulation is almost a dare to defy it.
167

GARDINER, supra note 117, at 151.

168

BLACK, supra note 116, at 35 (“Police officers tend to be more aggressive and severe
towards young people, often stopping them as a means of harassment.”).
169
TIMOTHY FLANAGAN & DENNIS LONGMIRE, AMERICAN’S VIEW OF CRIME AND JUSTICE:
A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 33-34 (1996); Charles Thomas & Jeffery Hyman,
Perceptions of Crime, Fear of Victimization, and Public Perceptions of Police Performance, 5
J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 305, 314 (1977).
170

LANGAN, supra note 26, at 15 (“[t]he younger the driver, the greater the likelihood of a
ticket”).
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B. Race
Racial profiling has received considerable attention over the past few years
through legislative,171 administrative,172 and judicial reforms.173 Because law reviews
and other materials have paid considerable attention to this issue it will be addressed
only briefly in this Article.
The data on race-based profiling and the exact impact race has had on police
discretion has focused primarily on issues surrounding the initial stop and subsequent
consent search practices and has provided little information concerning the influence
of race on the use of discretion in issuing summonses. To attempt to analyze the data
available for discriminatory practices in the enforcement of traffic offenses, which is
possible, would require an entire article, or perhaps a book. Such an endeavor will
not be undertaken in this research although there is evidence that people of varying
races face the potential to be subjected to varying degrees of enforcement based upon
factors unrelated to public safety.174
C. Sex
175

Sex is an immutable characteristic. Commonsense and empirical research have
clearly demonstrated that intra-sex and inter-sex communication and treatment often
vary. Thus, it might reasonably be presumed that the sex of the motorist may
influence how a particular police officer exercises discretion. The empirical research
on the influence of sex on the use of police discretion during traffic stops is limited.
That which does exist has revealed conflicting findings and perhaps provides the
weakest supporting evidence for unfair enforcement practices in the immutable
characteristics section.
One study has found that police are generally more lenient towards women
during traffic stops.176 While a survey administered on Canadian police found that if
placed in view of a video camera during a motor vehicle stop, male and female
officers were more likely to issue a ticket to the opposite sex.177

171
GEN. ACCT. OFF., RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORISTS STOPS
(2000).
172

PETER VERNIERO & PAUL ZOUBEK, THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW
TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (1999).
173
State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); Wilkins v. Maryland State
Police, civil action No. CCB-93-468 and MJG-93-468.
174
See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY POLICE PROFILING
CANNOT WORK (2002).
175

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

176

Schellenberg, supra note 3, at 671. Findings indicate “[t]hat officers were less likely to
ticket women than men.” Id.
177

Id.
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D. Place of Residence
Not being a resident of a particular municipality or area might also subject certain
motorists to greater enforcement by police,178 where the same offense if committed
by residents of the community179 may not receive a traffic summons.180 In essence,
because of the lack of public support for traffic enforcement, the police do not
enforce the traffic laws against local residents,181 or only against unpopular residents.
In this respect, traffic enforcement may be considered a “tax” on non-residents or
simply selective taxation.
E. The Privileged, Non-enforcement and Ticket Fixing
“Is there not in many places a tradition that certain public officials are above the
traffic laws.”182
“[T]he areas leading citizens may enjoy a degree of immunity.”183
To this point in the Article the review of the policing research has been limited to
those areas of traffic enforcement where a traffic summons is the result of the police
abusing their discretion in traffic enforcement by relying on factors unrelated to
legislative intent or rationally based public policy. This section covers another area
of law enforcement: Non-enforcement and de facto exemption from traffic
enforcement. Specifically, it is contended that those holding certain positions or in
certain occupations are immune from the often harsh use of police discretion in
traffic enforcement.184 The American Bar Association felt strongly enough

178
Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 561. “Particularly abhorrent to the fair-minded citizens is
discrimination in selecting the ‘victim’ of enforcement, especially nonresidents, and the evil
practices that generally accompany it. . . .”; BLACK, supra note 116, at 32. “It is also likely in
a small town or village, where they have more social information about the automobiles they
encounter, selective ticketing is more frequent: cars of strangers are probably more vulnerable
than those of local residents. . . .” Id.
179
Smith, supra note 26, at 66. “The police officer can favor local offenders over those
who are non-residents, and vice-versa.” Id.
180
WILLIAM WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW,
CUSTOM, AND MORALITY 59 (1970).
[T]he policemen divides the public into two major categories: the town driver and the
out-of-town driver. Little effort is made to arrest the town driver since the men on one
hand feel some degree of identification with him, and on the other recognize that the
case may be fixed. The out-of-town driver, however, is legitimate prey.
Id.
181

Schellenberg, supra note 3, at 668. “Thus, police have a predilection to trade leniency
for legitimacy, especially in smaller communities.” Id.
182

Vanderbilt, supra note 2, at 560.

183

BLACK, supra note 116, at 32.

184

Id.
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concerning the abuse of discretion in ticket fixing to propose model rules to govern
the dismissal of traffic complaints.185
Who does not receive traffic citations? People who are police,186 are related to
the police,187 hold positions of power and authority,188 or who frequently work with189
or come in friendly contact190 with the police are largely immune from traffic
enforcement. Regardless of the particular locality, people of high status in a
185
A.B.A. Comm. on the Traffic Court Program, STANDARDS FOR TRAFFIC JUSTICE 10-11
(1975) Section 6.0C General Principal. The court, or other tribunal, should maintain strict
control over case processing, to insure that all charges are properly classified and terminated;
Commentary: The obligation for sound administration cannot be delegated. The
supervising judge or hearing official is responsible for the proper disposition of every citation
returnable to his tribunal, and constant vigilance of non-adjudicatory functions should be
maintained. Id.
“Ticket fixing should not be tolerated. A ticket ‘fix’ is an obstruction of justice,
destructive of the rule of law, public morality and public safety.” See also sections 6.1 and 6.2
placing additional restrictions on the ability to ticket fix. Section 6.3 requires that audits be
conducted of police ticket books. Finally, Section 6.5 proposes that fines and costs should not
be used for revenue generating purposes. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, MAINE
TRAFFIC COURT STUDY 38 (1975). “Overall control of the issuance and distribution of traffic
tickets will narrow the opportunity associated with the processing of traffic cases to ‘fix’
tickets.” N. GARY HOLTEN & LAWSON LAMAR, THE CRIMINAL COURTS: STRUCTURES,
PERSONNEL, AND PROCESSES 64 (1991). “Among the faults found with these [lower] courts
are their capriciousness, their arbitrariness, their ignorance of the law and of proper procedure,
their denial of fundamental rights to some litigants and defendants, their subservience to local
political cliques, and their concern with generating fines and fees for themselves and their
towns or counties.” James P. Economos, Traffic Courts and Justice of Peace Courts, 25
N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 67 (1950). A classic study of how certain classes make themselves
immune, or at least partially immune from the law is C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE
(1959).
186
PAYTON, supra note 121, at 13. “There is an unwritten rule in law enforcement that you
do not give a traffic ticket to a fellow officer . . . [a reporter in San Diego] . . . found that out of
108,000 traffic citations issued during the six months of his study, not one citation was issued
to police officers, their wives, city council members, county supervisors, municipal and
superior court judges, and major county and city department heads . . . he concluded that the
policemen were exceptionally good drivers, since 10 to the 36th power [this was the chance of
them not receiving a ticket] would equal more stars and planets than there were in the sky.” 16
THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW Winter 1992 36-37. A Kansas City reporter using drivers
license records found that “[t]hree of 1,100 police officers received traffic tickets, significantly
fewer than the average 1,000 of every 1,100 drivers.”; BLACK, supra note 116, at 34-35. “If
the police learn that a driver is himself an officer, this too discourages them from writing a
ticket . . . People with other ties to the police also have a degree of immunity . . . friends and
acquaintances . . . relatives of another officer, and ex-officers. . . . Taxi drivers, truck drivers,
fire fighters, government officials, and clergymen-all respectable people who also work on
the streets or who serve the public-are among those who are likely to receive special
consideration.” Vanderbilt, supra note 2, 560-61.
187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id.
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particular community are generally immune from traffic laws.191 Families may also
have some degree of immunity from receiving a ticket from police officers. One
officer had reported that in his nine years of policing he had never given a ticket to
someone in a family car.192 Another officer stated
I like to get them when they’re alone. I make it a point not to stop cars
with whole families in them. I can’t take it when kids say, ‘Is he a real
policeman?’ and I'm writing a ticket for daddy. Daddy can do no wrong,
so I don’t like to embarrass him in front of the kids.193
For certain privileged persons mentioned in this section, once a ticket has been
issued it can still be overcome though an absolute liability offense, by means of
political, rather than legal process. Other factors such as purchasing varied police
promotional stickers or cards may also result in the motorist not receiving a
citation194 (e.g. tickets to the policeman’s ball or donations to a favorite policesponsored charity).
VI. DISCUSSION
Throughout the Article the use and abuse of traffic enforcement power has been
explored. It has also been demonstrated that the legal protections afforded citizens
are ineffective at preventing law enforcement from abusing this discretionary power,
if there is any current right to warrant judicial intervention at all. This section
explores the fundamental constitutional underpinnings that address this specific
issue, yet does not appear to have been applied by the court. In Marbury v.
Madison195 the Court stated that we “live by a government of laws, not of men.”196
Justice Scalia, the author of the Whren opinion, boldly dissented in Morrison v.
Olsen197 on these very grounds.198
A “government of laws, not of men”199 signifies a deeply rooted distrust for
expansive official discretion200 as perhaps best demonstrated in the historical origins

191
WILSON, supra note 133, at 141. “In all cases, circumstances of person and condition
are taken into account-community notables are excused because they have influence . . . .” Id.
192

BLACK, supra note 116, at 34.

193

Id.

194

Smith, supra note 26, at 67.

195

5 U.S. 137 (1803).

196

Id. at 163 (“The government of the United states has been emphatically termed a
government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right.”).
197

487 U.S. 654, 697 (1987).

198

Id. at 697 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“[i]t is the proud boast of our democracy that we live
by ‘a government of laws and not of men.’ Many Americans are familiar with the phrase; not
many know its derivation. It comes from Part the First, Article XXX, of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 . . .”).
199

Id.
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of the Fourth Amendment.201 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prevent
the law from being applied according to the discretionary powers of “petty
officers.”202 The Writs of Assistance are the clear origin of the Fourth Amendment
in the colonies,203 though the roots can be traced much further back to post-Magna
Carta England,204 Roman Law,205 and the Old Testament.206
Clearly the implicit discretionary authority given to law enforcement in Whren
and the discretionary authority explicitly given to law enforcement in Atwater
contradict the premise that we live by a government of laws and embraced by
countless courts throughout the history of this nation.207 If police have the unbridled
discretion to stop any motorist because they observe a traffic violation and need not
provide any additional justification, while at the same time it is commonly known
that virtually every motorist is violating the law, a disparity exists between the law as
it is written and the law as it is enforced.208 Some legal scholars have come to define
a disparity between the law as it is written and the law as it is enforced as the
definition of a police state.209 Yet the motor vehicle stop is not the end of the police
discretion; it continues with the discretion of whether or not to issue a summons and
the decision of whether to arrest. How does this discretionary authority relinquished
to the police comply with the original intent of the Fourth Amendment? It does not.
In fact it is more offensive than the evil it was created to prevent.

200

Anthony Amsterdam, Note, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 369 (1974). “The regulation of police behavior is what the Fourth Amendment is all
about.” Id.
201
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 96-97
(1980). “A major point of the [Fourth] amendment, obviously, was to keep the government
from disrupting our lives without at least moderately convincing justification. The rationale
intertwines with another - and the historic customs abuses are relevant here too - namely, a
fear of official discretion.” Id.
202

Id.

203

LASSON, infra note 204, at 51-78; Joseph Strengel, Note, The Background to the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Part I. 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278, 295-98
(1969).
204

Joseph Strengel, Note, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States: Part I. 3 U. RICH L. REV. 278, 281 (1969); NELSON LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 20
(1937).
205

LASSON, supra note 204, at 15-18.

206

Id. at 13-15; W.W. DAVIES, THE CODES OF HAMMURABI AND MOSES 33 (1905);
SAMUEL HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 9-11 (1964).
207

Try using search term “government of laws, not of men” in an electronic search on
Lexis or Weslaw.
208
Hayes Elder, Comment, Police Discretion and Traffic Law Enforcement, 39 WASH. L.
REV. 840, 845 (1964). “Substantial variation between enforced law and written law virtually
defines a ‘police state.’” Id.
209

Id.
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The Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to the repeated, lawful abuses
by petty officers in the name of the King. The Writs of Assistance210 were issued by
the King of England211 to petty officers for the life of the King plus six months212 for
the purpose of insuring that colonists did not evade taxes.213 Similar powers were
granted to petty officers in England but under different titles.214 The general purpose
of the Writ of Assistance was to insure that revenue was generated for the King.215
During the colonial period the King was the de facto equivalent of the state. Has
much changed? What is the purpose behind requiring police to issue a certain
number of tickets? The answer is to generate revenue for the state.216 Adding further
offense217 to the indignity of utilizing the criminal justice system as a means to
generate revenue is that the police may utilize traffic summons writing as a
bargaining chip for their own self gain.218
VII. CONCLUSIONS
As the Marbury Court stated: “The government of the United states has been
emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested right.”219 The abuse of discretion by government agents was declared
unconstitutional again by the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins:220
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as to make unjust and illegal discriminations between

210

Noted earlier in the text and accompanying footnotes of this section, the Writs of
Assistance were the impetus behind the Fourth Amendment.
211

LASSON, supra note 204, at 57

212

Id.

213

Id. at 51-52.

214

TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-30; Geoffrey
Hemphill, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn’t This Exactly What the Framers Were
Trying to Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215, 218 (1995).
215

LASSON, supra note 204, 51-52.

216
Netherdon, supra note 150, at 583 (noting self sufficiency from revenue derived from
fines is common place for courts handling traffic offenses). “‘To put it briefly, violations
bureaus in most cities seem to exist mainly for revenue purposes and appear to be considered
in that light by the motoring public.’” Id. at 588 citing WARREN TRAFFIC COURTS 21 (1942).
217

Hayes Elder, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement 39 WASH. L. REV. 840, 41
(1964). “Although the first concern with traffic safety law is to increase the motorist’s chance
for survival, these traffic laws, and the enforcement of them, create other problems that can
undermine values fundamental to our society.” Id.
218

See text and footnotes referring to the police use of ticket writing as a means to gain
bargaining power in union negotiations.
219

5 U.S. 137, 163.

220

118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.221
The decisions of Whren and Atwater are in direct contradiction to Marbury, the
dominant pillar of American jurisprudence. Whren and Atwater simply cannot exist
in the same jurisprudential scheme with Marbury. Either Marbury has been
overturned or Whren and Atwater cannot stand. If at the discretion of a patrolman a
citizen can be arbitrarily taken into custody for not wearing a seatbelt and the next
citizen stopped who is not wearing a seatbelt can be released without any penalty,
there is no law. There is a man who simply punishes suspects at will. Enforcement
practices such as this, bearing the official authorization of the courts, represents a
police state. It cannot be reconciled with any conception of a government of laws.
How courts have evaded addressing this constitutional issue is mind boggling.
What courts will do in the future remains to be seen. Until the unbridled discretion
of police is restricted in the traffic enforcement context, the infamous quote of
Marybury has been reduced to, and remains little more than, a mere “form of
words.”222

221

Id. at 373-74.

222

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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